Implicit Bodily Knowledge and Practical Epistemic Injustice by Halie White

Date: Friday, April 11, 2025
Time: 2:30pm
Location: Sakamaki C-308

Discussion of epistemic injustice has thus far been focused on propositional knowledge (knowing-that) following Miranda Fricker’s notions by hermeneutical and testimonial injustice (2007). I extend the discourse by providing an analysis of epistemic injustice applied to practical knowledge (knowing-how). First, I offer an account of knowing-how that focuses on bodily subjectivity. Second, I propose a general account of practical epistemic injustice as a forced distraction from one’s performance of a skill. This distraction is due to prejudicial evaluations of one’s capacities that link bodily identities with stereotyped deficits. From this framework, I argue for two kinds of practical epistemic injustice — performance injustice and attunement injustice — and articulate their respective epistemic harms.