Abstract: I argue that the widespread use of “justification” language in contemporary epistemology carries substantial normative presuppositions. “Justification” language in general presupposes that the action in question is pro tanto wrong. In the case of epistemology, discussion of whether beliefs are “justified” insinuates that belief in general is to be suspected or regretted, even if one’s answer is that a given belief is justified. This feeds into a negative bias in epistemology, tilting the scales in favour of skepticism in advance of inquiry. Moreover, since there are substantive connections between epistemology and action — responsible action requires responsible belief — this bias towards the skeptical also results in a bias against efforts at reform. For this reason, the role of “justification” language in epistemology constitutes a harmful ideology, further entrenching oppressive elements of the status quo.

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Presented by THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT COLLOQUIUM SERIES

2:30 p.m. (HST) January 18, 2022 (in-person)

Location: UH Mānoa, the Pacific Ocean Science and Technology (POST) building, room 126

Lecture by Dr. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Professor of Philosophy
University of British Columbia