The Asymmetrical Structure of the U.S.-North Korean Security Dilemma

September 8, 12:00pm - 1:00pm
Mānoa Campus, East-West Center Research Program, Burns Hall, Room 3012 Add to Calendar

The Asymmetrical Structure of the U.S.-North Korean Security Dilemma


Er-Win Tan

POSCO Visiting Fellow

Thursday, September 8, 2016 | 12:00 noon to 1:00pm
John A. Burns Hall, Room 3012 (3rd floor)

Past case studies on the security dilemma have focused on the self-defeating pursuit of power and security by utilizing case studies of such interaction between two states of roughly equal power, such as the US-Soviet nuclear arms during the Cold War. In contrast, the pattern of US-North Korean interaction can be described as an asymmetric security dilemma, between a weak state with nuclear ambitions (North Korea) and the world’s most powerful state (the US). By most conventional indices of material power, the US should have no problem imposing its will on North Korea, yet Pyongyang has demonstrated a surprising ability to rely on deliberate brinkmanship and guerrilla diplomacy to exploit loopholes in its interaction with the US that have enabled the North Korean leadership to level the playing field. In so doing, North Korean negotiating tactics have a twofold effect – that North Korea has increased to extent of its negotiating leverage to compensate for its position of weakness in its asymmetric relationship with the US; ii) in so doing, however, the few instruments of policy – in particular, the status of its missile and nuclear programs - that have enabled Pyongyang to even the playing field have become issues over which the North Korean leadership will not give away easily. Thus, in comparison to other case studies on the security dilemma, there are grounds to argue that this asymmetry of interaction poses additional obstacles for the formulation of policy towards North Korea in the US and her allies, as well as within Pyongyang itself.


Er-Win Tan is a POSCO Visiting Research Fellow with the East West Center and Visiting Senior Lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies at the University of Malaya. He completed his PhD thesis, ‘A Comparison of Offensive Realist, Defensive Realist, and Constructivist Perspectives on the US-North Korean Security Dilemma, 1992-2001’, at Aberystwyth University. His research interests include Security Dilemma Theory, Strategic Culture, Security Regimes, Non-Offensive Defense, Deterrence Theory, Confidence and Security Building Measures, US-North Korean Interaction, and Security and Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific Region.


https://sites.google.com/site/erwintanphd


Event Sponsor
East-West Center, Research Program, Mānoa Campus

More Information
Laura Moriyama, 944-7444, Laura.Moriyama@eastwestcenter.org

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