During the past two weeks I met a few veterans of the Korean war who said they still did not know why they had to fight in Korea and why other GIs are still fighting. They said there was nothing in it for themselves but misery and suffering, while the makers of ammunition, weapons, warships and aircraft made the killing in dough.
"We ought to take them over there to fight for every dollar and cent they rake in. And they'll find out they can't take the loot with them. They'll die like our buddies," a veteran crippled for life, said with strong bitterness.
Another wounded veteran suggested: "Why not send the guys who are sent up for life in penitentiaries or who are sentenced to be executed? If you stay in Korea long, you're going to die anyway and these guys are slated to die sooner or later. Why send us over there to die?"
Someone commented that many who are sentenced for life or to die have been framed up. Many are found guilty because of inadequate counsel and prejudiced juries and judges. Others receive sentences too harsh because they are underdogs in society.
Peace Would Bring Happiness
Why not peace? Isn't this better? Yes, this is better, the veterans agreed. And they looked sad as they explained this war is without honorable principle or aim on our side— so unprincipled that they often think soldiers should be recruited from the penitentiaries.
Why should he have to be the one to be crippled in such a war? One asked. And he added that it is very fortunate for the Americans that the North Koreans and Chinese troops do not use napalm bombs against them.
The veterans were full of sympathy for the poor Korean people they had seen in overcrowded Pusan and in the countryside — people starved, sick or dying, people with broken families and homes bombed or burned from the skies.
Valuable Lives Sacrificed To Preserve Bad Rulers
These GIs felt that they had been instruments of intervention in Korea. The talk by the military brass of fighting to maintain "the American way of life" and to preserve "freedom" in Korea was ridiculous to them. Why sacrifice valuable lives to keep the gangster Syngman Rhee and the landlords in power? They queried.
As I listened to them I recalled a somewhat similar situation in China after the last war, when U. S. leaders denied intervention but in fact, did everything short of all-out fighting on Chiang Kai-shek's side to keep him in power. For example, on Oct. 30, 1945, General Albert Wedemeyer told the press:
"U. S. troops will not intervene directly in the Chinese civil war because traditional U. S. policy holds that other nations will be permitted to choose their own form of government without foreign intervention."
Marines Griped At Assignment With Recent Enemy
This was ridiculous talk and American correspondents, who were not gagged as much as correspondents in Korea are today, made fun of Gen. Wedemeyer. Fifty thousand U. S. marines who had been brought to China, reportedly to help disarm the Japanese, were not executing their task. Chiang was trying to use more and more Japanese in the civil war against Yenan's forces and Japanese commanders in one or two places pleaded with the
Americans to accept their surrender. American marines, in this situation, guarded railways with Japanese, puppet and Kuomintang troops. The marines griped about this duty they were forced to perform side by side with their recent enemy, still fully armed. They rode coal trains with Chiang's soldiers through Yenan-held territory. Occasionally villagers on Yenan's side took pot shots at these trains.
"Smell of Gunpowder" Said Pungent In Wedemeyer's Words
General Wedemeyer authorized air strafing of villages which did not heed cease-fire requests to let the trains go through. Against hostile villages he ordered "adequate military action." Yenan blasted him, saying it found the "smell of gunpowder very pungent" in his words.
Then one day a U. S. marine unit fired about a couple of dozen mortar shells into a village because the people there did not turn over to the Americans the Chinese who had shot at a U. S. guarded coal train.
On, one of my trips to theater headquarters I mentioned to Gen. Wedemeyer that U. S. soldiers were guarding Chiang's trains passing through hostile territory.
The general said that his foremost duty was to protect American soldiers and he was forced to blow up the village when the villagers did not heed his request. When I mentioned that our troops were being sent into hostile territory, he said that without U. S. assistance, Chiang could not transport necessary coal to the cities.
General's Denials Criticized and Ridiculed
The colonel under whom I served was extremely loyal to the general and he constantly said that" the general was not getting a good press. It was bad enough that Yenan attacked the general in its news broadcasts, he said. When Gen. Wedemeyer denied that we were intervening, Yenan asked: What would be the general's reaction if Yenan's troops landed on the West Coast and occupied Yosemite Park and other places?
So when the colonel sent me to report to the general in November 1945, I mentioned the general's press statements. The general was bitter at some correspondents. He felt he was put in a tough situation. He said the general staff in Washington instructed him to hold press conferences and so he had to meet the press. The newspaper reporters asked him many questions.
He said he answered freely, taking the correspondents into his confidence. The next thing he knew he was criticized for his statements, he explained.
Chiang Scolded Subordinates For Indulging In Prostitution, Gambling . . .
All these things when added up, indicated that the policy of supporting Chiang to crush Yenan's forces was a flop. I talked to high American officers in headquarters who back in September had believed Chiang would have the Yenan forces licked within three months. They were now disgusted with Chiang's forces.
In this situation, the U. S. held the balance between civil war and peace in China. Continued U. S. military support of Chiang's corrupt regime was no solution to China's problems. This meant civil war, when China needed democracy and a firm economic foundation.
Even the people in Shanghai who had welcomed the Kuomintang as "liberators," were saying a few months later that the Japanese had been much better. Terrible inflation and unemployment, besides graft, corruption and bad and inefficient government had made them lose heart in Chiang, whose colossal portrait decorated a side of a building on a main thoroughfare. General Wedemeyer said that Chiang's trusted subordinates kept the truth from him.
I hardly thought so, particularly after reading Chiang's telegram to Mayor Chien Ta-chun of Shanghai, dated October 26, saying: "It has been reliably brought to my knowledge that the military, political and party officials in Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping and Tientsin have been leading extravagant lives, indulging in prostitution and gambling," etc., etc.
Chiang Had Disillusioned His Supporters
Now Gen. Wedemeyer seemed more willing to accept a critical appreciation of Chiang's government and military forces. One afternoon I reported to Gen. Wedemeyer and his immediate staff, including a Gen. Brink, whom I believe is the same person who recently committed suicide in the Pentagon building.
He was in charge of the warfare in Viet-Nam, on the American side, and it was reported that he had appeared dejected. In this session there was no more talk about the big split in Yenan's leadership or of 39 U. S. trained divisions under Chiang who would crush the Yenan forces in three months. In September, when I had reported to Gen. Wedemeyer, what I said was not the kind of information and analysis that he wanted to hear. I gave nearly the same report and he and his staff officers asked numerous questions, as though going over me with a fine-toothed comb.
What If U. S. Actively Fought On Chiang's Side?
Finally one of them asked: What if the U. S. threw her full force unconditionally on Chiang's side? I discussed the growing chorus of protests in the U. S. against intervention.
Would the people oppose, remain silent or support such a military adventure, which would involve our country in years of warfare? The Japanese troops bogged down in China. They lived off the land. How much better could white soldiers in blockhouses in the Chinese countryside do? And exposed to constant guerrilla action for months and months?
At this session I recall we disagreed this point. The generals felt the GIs could crush Yenan's forces in short order. I reminded them that in September they had told me that Chiang's forces could do that in three months.
The Mass of People Opposed War
The U. S. program to preserve Chiang's regime can be achieved only by killing the vast majority of people, for opposition to Chiang grows from the very feudal, semi-colonial condition of China which the people want to change. We should bring about reforms.
Chiang's weakness became more apparent in the face of mass opposition to civil war and U. S. intervention. All this drew Washington's closer attention. Four generals from Washington visited Shanghai. I was instructed to brief them in the Air Corps map room.
A G-2 lieutenant colonel gave an optimistic picture of Chiang's strength and potentialities. I analyzed Chiang's weaknesses in the face of Yenan's economic, military, political and cultural operations. Civil war was unpopular and the Chinese generally, blamed Chiang and the U. S. for denying them peace. At about this time, Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley resigned. This came one day (November 26) after six congressmen introduced resolutions calling for the withdrawal of U. S. troops, transports and supplies. They urged that the U. S. use her efforts to bring about a coalition government based on popular land, tax and government reforms. General George C. Marshall succeeded Hurley. Mounting anti-civil war protests in China and the U. S. gave Hurley no other choice.