Our diplomats are generally men of wealth, sent off by Washington to establish and/or maintain amicable relationships with foreign powers. At times a diplomatic post becomes a center of intrigue, to influence the removal or overthrow of an unfriendly foreign regime. The diplomatic posts are also the eyes and ears of our government.
If militant trade unionists or their leaders were appointed diplomats, they undoubtedly would not encourage the support of corrupt and anti-labor regimes like those of Chiang Kai-shek, the puppet Bao Dai in IndoChina or of unpopular, repressive Syngman Rhee. But for our country to have such a corps of diplomats in foreign outposts, the voice of the, working people must become) dominant in Washington. As it is, with 60 million workers in our country, we do not have one representative of labor in Congress.
A man like John Foster Dulles, therefore, can step into government at will and become the architect of the unilateral, Wall Street-inspired Japanese peace treaty. In the face of overwhelming opposition in Japan to the treaty, which is history, it was rammed down the throats of the Japanese people. In Paris, this same Dulles a couple of weeks ago advocated war with the Soviet Union and China, by aggressively hitting explosive spots such as Indo-China. The world remembers that Dulles was the one who made a hurried trip to Tokyo and to the 38th parallel on the eve of the Korean war.
Hurley Didn't Understand Demand for Changes In China
Big monopolies use all sorts of diplomats, whose basic subservience to dollar profits is the same, and whose social and economic positions underlie their approach to an understanding of politics.
Patrick J. Hurley, an Oklahoma oil millionaire, was such a man. When he arrived in China in 1944 as President Roosevelt's diplomatic trouble-shooter, he could not appreciate the fundamental changes taking place in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country. He apparently thought of patching the tattered relationship between Chungking and Yenan and so go down in history as a diplomatic "savior" of China.
Part of Hurley's discussions with the Chinese Communist officials took place right outside a mud shack in which I lived for a time in Yenan. There in the open courtyard he talked with Chou En-lai, through the latter's interpreter, Ch'en Chia-kang.
We Listened To Interesting Details
I became keenly interested in the Hurley mission for U. S. relationship with China would be hinged to its outcome. We listened to table conversation and learned interesting details. In the U. S. Army Observer Section equalitarianism was emphasized to the extreme to impress the Communists, and so we enlisted men ate at the same table with officers.
I learned that at the first meeting of Hurley and Mao Tse-tung, the presidential envoy first stated Chiang Kai-shek's proposals. Chiang demanded that the Communists put their armies and territories under him in return for his concessions, which Included legal status for the Communists, a seat in the Supreme National Defense Council and some lend-lease supplies.
As General Hurley talked, an expression of annoyance came to Chairman Mao's face. Mao denounced Chiang. He asked how could the Communist armies and millions of people in areas carved behind enemy lines by blood and tears, be given up to the corrupt Chungking government, a regime in which the people of the Communist-led, liberated areas and the vast majority of people in Kuo-mintang China had no voice? He lashed out against Chiang for his government's corruption, graft-ridden conscription system, its passive war policy and defeatism.
The Discussion Went On Outside My Shack
Hurley parried with a statement that Mao was only repeating what the Japanese said about Chiang. He said he considered Mao and Chiang the first "patriots" of China.
Mao replied that he was not repeating the enemy's words, but was expressing similar views expressed by President Roosevelt, Churchill, Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen, and that he offered his criticism to improve China.
Hurley backed down and said he understood what Mao meant. He suggested that this part of the discussion be out out of the record and they start all over again.
The morning following his arrival in Yenan, Hurley and Colonel David Barrett, our commanding officer, headed across the Yen River to the other, side of the valley, to continue discussion with Yenan leaders. When they returned to our compound, they sat in the open space right outside my shack. Hurley sprawled on a beach chair with his legs stretched far out. The short, chunky colonel held the front part of a small stool on which he sat and rocked back and forth while he listened to the long-winded presidential envoy.
"There Should Be No Fear of Communism"
Hurley planned to leave on the fourth day after his arrival Fairly early that morning, Chou En-lai came to see him. Hurleywas again sunning himself outside my shack. Their discussion centered on a piece of paper Hurley held in a gesticulating hand. Here I shall quote from my personal note:
"General Hurley seemed to have written his opinion in the document, and it seemed that upon this piece of paper, which he handed Chou En-lai, negotiations were to continue in Chungking. The general mentioned 'Roosevelt's Four Freedoms' several times and said 'Fear' was the point he had stressed in drafting the document. The general said, 'Freedom from Fear is the basis for establishing a coalition government of China to fight the common enemy (Japan). Once united, there should be no fear of Communism.'''
After Chou had left, Colonel Barrett talked with Hurley. Then shortly afterwards both of them went across the river to further discussion. They took up the document which Hurley had earlier handed to Chou En-lai. This became known as "Hurley's Five Points" which he drew up in English and had translated for Mao and his colleagues.
Chiang's Signature Was Needed To the "Five Points"
Three points of the five were Hurley's ideas, couched in his exact words. The other two, coalition government and united command of China's armies—Nationalist and Communist—were Mao's suggestions expressed in Hurley's own words.
Independently and of his own volition, Hurley had added all the fancy trimmings of phraseology and injected such items as "the supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed." But a few months later, after negotiations failed, he told correspondents in Washington that to give arms to the Communists would be like "recognizing another Chinese regime."
In a matter-of-fact manner he included such clauses as "the right of writ of habeas corpus and the right of residence," which a person who knew about Chiang's concentration camps and his Tai Li secret police would never have thrown in in such a casual manner.
After Mao Tse-tung read the "Five Points" Hurley asked Mao ' if he would sign them. Mao said he would, and wrote his signature. Hurley then signed as a witness. Now all that the "Five Points" required to start off negotiations with a bang, as Hurley expected, was Chiang Kai-shek's signature. This, Hurley seemed confident of obtaining.
Were Expression of "Jeffersonian Democracy"
The presidential envoy reassured Mao that after all the "Five Points" were merely a genuine expression of "Jeffersonian Democracy. Then he smiled and looked Mao straight in the eyes. Mao held back his smile until he had heard what Hurley had said through an interpreter, then he beamed and nodded his head.
Mao Invited To Live In U. S. Embassy
Hurley next suggested that Mao write a letter to President Roosevelt, stating that his envoy was successfully carrying out his mission and that Mao appreciated Hurley's endeavors. In return, Hurley said he would write a letter in behalf of President, Roosevelt, stating that the United States appreciated the remarkable war effort of the Chinese Communists.
After these details had been cleared away, Hurley was overcome with optimism, since the conversation progressed so smoothly. He probably pictured Mao sitting in Chungking, working closely at Chiang's elbow. Out of a clear sky he invited the Communist leader, for whose head Chiang once offered $250,000, to fly to Chungking with him and live in the American embassy under "United States protection."
Mao answered that he was busy but would send Chou En-lai with Ch'en Chai-kang as interpreter.
Hurley Received a Rousing Sendoff
As a passing remark, Mao told Hurley that should negotiations fail, Yenan would call a conference of the Liberated Areas to establish a centralized administration. This would have meant a separate government in North China.
We went down to the airfield to observe Hurley's departure. Hundreds of Chinese thronged the runway to get a glimpse of the presidential envoy. All over Yenan "blackboard newspapers" and large slogans chalked on walls featured the Hurley visit with heavy emphasis on hope for Chinese unity. The natives smiled, for this meant the lifting of the Nationalist blockade of their areas and no civil war. To students who had come in from Nationalist China, it meant freedom to go anywhere in their own country to pursue a livelihood. They could even go home without being picked up by Tai Li agents.
Chiang Resisted Democratic Changes
To Hurley with all his dramatics, the millions of Chinese did not seem to be of concern. He was like a chess player, thinking in terms of dealing with a few top leaders. What he did not appreciate was the fact that in economically poor North China, the millions who enjoyed a new deal and greater freedom for the first time, supported their leaders. The people wanted a change and they were getting it. Chiang resisted it.
Hurley took off and we next heard that he caught a cold and spent a couple of days in bed. When he went to Chiang, the latter firmly rejected his "Jeffersonian Democracy." It was common talk in Chungking that Hurley complained that T. V. Soong had ruined his efforts by briefing Chiang in advance.
With negotiations broken down, Hurley sided with Chiang. The "Five Points" and "Jeffersonian Democracy" became mere words.