

The Department of Philosophy Presents

HOW TO BE A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST AND STILL SAVE THE GREATER NUMBER

Many people agree that, other things being equal, agents who have the option of saving either a smaller or a greater number of different people have a moral duty to save the greater number. While consequentialists have an easy time vindicating this pre-theoretically plausible assumption, it is far from obvious that it can be given a deontological rationale (and it also has been famously rejected by a number of deontologists). After criticising Scanlon's contractualist attempt to defend the duty to save the greater number, I present and defend a new proposal, which appeals to a theory-neutral principle about how contributory moral reasons combine in determining an all-things-considered obligations.



**PRESENTED BY:
BEN KIESEWETTER
PROFESSOR OF PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY AT BIELEFELD
UNIVERSITY, GERMANY**



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Time: 2:30 PM (HST)

Location: Sakamaki Hall C-308