Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council of the City and County of Honolulu

773 P.2d (Haw., April 18, 1989)
Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs' Attorneys:
  1. Sandy Beach Defense Fund
  2. Friends of Queen’s Beach
  3. Life of the Land
  4. Shirley M. Lum
  5. Philip I. Estermann
  6. Elizabeth G. Mathews
  7. Ursula Retherford
  1. Ronald A. Albu, Kailua HI
  2. Gerard A. Jervis, Kailua, HI
Defendants: Defendants Attorneys:
  1. City Council of the City and County of Honolulu
  2. Kaiser Development Company
  3. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Company
  1. Jane H. Howell, Deputy Corp. Counsel, City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, HI
  2. Kenneth R. Kupchak, Honolulu, HI
  3. R. Charles Bocken, Honolulu, HI
  4. Robert H. Thomas, Honolulu, HI
  5. Kamala J. Larsen, Honolulu, HI
  6. Steven S. Michaels, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI
Court:

Supreme Court of Hawaii

Opinion by: Justice Lum
Other Jurists: Court Below:
    N/A

N/A

Key laws involved:
  • Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”), Hawaii Revised Statutes (“H.R.S.”), §§ 91-1, 205A-1 et seq.
Summary:
  1. The appellants challenged the City Council of the City and County of Honolulu’s (“Council”) issuance to the Kaiser Development Co. (“Kaiser”) a Special Management Area (“SMA”) use permit. The appellants asserted that the County was required to hold a contested case hearing pursuant to the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (“HAPA”) under the CZMA. The lower court dismissed the case finding that the CZMA did not require a HAPA exempt legislative body to conduct a contested case hearing for the issuance of a SMA use permit. The appellants appealed and the Supreme Court of Hawaii granted a writ of certiorari.
  2. Kaiser proposed to develop single-family homes nearby Sandy Beach Park on the island of Oahu in Hawaii. Kaiser was required to obtain a SMA use permit pursuant to the CZMA because a portion of the development project included portions of a SMA. On February 3, 1986, the City and County of Honolulu (“County”) accepted Kaiser’s SMA use permit application. On April 1, 1986, the Department of Land Utilization (“DLU”) held a public hearing. After the hearing, the DLU sent to the Council its recommendation for approval of Kaiser’s SMA use permit application. The Council referred to its Planning and Zoning Committee Kaiser’s application. During the following year, the Council or its Planning and Zoning Committee discussed the application several times.
  3. On April 1, 1987, the Council held a public hearing in response to concerns regarding the potential impact of Kaiser’s proposed development project. At the hearing, the Council deferred action on Kaiser’s SMA use permit application for further consideration of the testimony offered and to prepare findings of fact. On April 15, 1987, the Council held another public hearing at which the Council granted Kaiser’s SMA use permit application and made extensive findings of fact. Subsequently, the appellants filed two similar lawsuits challenging the issuance of the SMA use permit claiming that their personal, economic, and aesthetic interest would be adversely affected by the proposed project.
  4. The appellants argued that the Council was required to hold contested case hearings for the issuance of a SMA use permit pursuant to the CZMA. The court held that the County’s SMA use permit application procedures complied with the CZMA:
    a) Appellants asserted that the Council acts in its administrative capacity when issuing SMA permits. Therefore, even though H.R.S. § 91-1 specifically exempts legislative and judicial bodies from HAPA, the appellants contended that HAPA’s procedural requirements were applicable when the Council acts in issuing a SMA use permit. The court found that the Council has both legislative and non-legislative powers. The Council exercises its legislative powers when it creates laws for the regulation of future cases. The Council exercises its non-legislative powers when it administers a law already in existence. The court concluded that the Council’s approval of Kaiser’s SMA use permit application was a non-legislative act because it was administering the CZMA. The court, however, also found that H.R.S. § 91-1 exception applies to legislative bodies regardless of the type of power exercised by the legislative body. Thus, the court held that the Council was not subject to HAPA’s procedural requirement when acting in either a legislative or non-legislative capacity.
    b) Appellants argued that the CZMA requires that all authorities, which includes a legislative or an administrative body must, comply with the HAPA requirements in administering the CZMA permit process. Based on the legislative history and the language of the CZMA, the court found that the CZMA allows each authority to decide on the nature of the hearings in reviewing a SMA use permit application. Hence, the court held that the CZMA does not require that all authorities must comply with HAPA requirements in administering the CZMA permit process.
    c) The court considered whether the CZMA requires the Council to establish a regulatory scheme for administering SMA use permit application procedures in compliance with HAPA. After examining the ordinance created by the Council in establishing a regulatory scheme for processing SMA use permit applications, the court found that the regulatory scheme was consistent with the procedures se forth in H.R.S. § 91-3(a).
  5. Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision upholding the validity of the Council’s procedures for issuing a SMA use permit.