THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB (continued)
THE SUCCESSFUL TEST AND THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB
At 5:30 A.M. the bomb was detonated at the test site at Alamogordo. The specter that
confronted the observers was more awesome and impressive than even the experts had
conceived. First, the blast of brilliant orange and blue lights lit the early-morning
sky—a fire ball "as bright as several midday suns,"; then a blossoming mushroom-shaped
cloud billowed hugely above the horizon, and a blast and shock wave broke windows
145 miles away. It would be reported later that, at the explosion site, a crater 1,200
feet in diameter was formed, and the desert sand had turned to glass in the intense
heat of the atomic blast. In the wake of this incredible display, military personnel
attempted to limit any unauthorized knowledge of its occurrence and downplayed the
event to local papers and eyewitnesses, including "a blind woman who saw the
light." In the official secret report the scientists estimated that the destructive
power of the bomb was equivalent to 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT.
On that evening in Potsdam President Truman received a cryptic message referring to
the test: "operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem
satisfactory and already exceed expectations. . . ." For the President of the
United States this was a very important message. Not only was he now assured that
a nuclear bomb was a practicality and could be delivered against Japan, he was armed
with information that provided a stronger hand in his deliberations with the Soviet
Union. No longer so dependent on Soviet cooperation in the Far East to force a Japanese
surrender, he could take a firmer, more confident stand with Stalin in the negotiations
for a postwar peace.
In particular, he was critical of the fact that the goals set out in the Yalta agreements
for Eastern Europe were not being pursued in good faith by the Soviets, and he was
adamant that the United States expected full cooperation. He also was more and more
convinced that the war in the Pacific must end as soon as possible. Delay would merely
provide the Soviets with further territorial acquisitions and give them greater leverage
in the subsequent peace settlement with Japan and influence with China. Diplomacy
regarding the situation was becoming as important to Truman as the plans to proceed
with delivery of the bomb against Japan.
Emboldened by the news that the United States now possessed the power of atomic weapons,
Truman became more forceful and assertive in the meetings that followed. His displeasure
with Soviet action in Eastern Europe was evident, and his expectations for better
compliance with the Yalta arrangements were set forth clearly and unequivocally. Yet
at the same time that Truman worried about Soviet practices in Eastern Europe, he
continued to pursue the plan to encourage a Soviet war declaration against Japan in
case the bomb failed to secure Japan’s surrender.
During the next few days Truman (via Prime Minister Churchill) was informed by Stalin
about several Japanese approaches to the Soviet Union indicating that Japan "wished
to bring hostilities to an end but was determined to fight on to the death so long
as Unconditional Surrender was demanded." This did not come as a surprise to
the President, whose own officials had received a number of overtures from Japanese
officials regarding a willingness to discuss the terms of a peace settlement. These
overtures were not interpreted by the United States as "offers to capitulate."
Rather, the view taken, as represented by Acting Secretary of State Crew’s statement
on July 10, was that, "Conversations relating to peace have been reported to
the Department from various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been
made to this Government, directly or indirectly, by a person who could establish his
authority to speak for the Japanese Government, and in no case has an offer to surrender
been made." Consequently, the U.S. government assumed that any feelers reported
were mere propagandistic manipulations, and as long as the Japanese government refused
to follow up formally on the gestures of some of its individual officials, this view
prevailed.
In addition to U.S. skepticism regarding Japanese intentions to surrender, U.S. military
intelligence had been intercepting messages from Japan regarding the use of the Soviet
Union as a mediator and had forwarded them to the President on July 15. Thus, within
two days of his arrival in Europe President Truman knew of Japan’s wavering resolve
for continuing the war and its interest in approaching the Soviets for assistance
in ending the war. He also knew about the successful test of the atomic bomb, a factor
that strengthened his commitment to demanding unconditional surrender.
Starting in June several Japanese officials had begun to contact Soviet officials
about the possibility of a Japan—Soviet Union rapprochement. Several feelers were
extended, including visits with Soviet Ambassador Malik in Japan. Yet the Soviets
continued to rebuff them. Japan’s second-best option then was to seek the assistance
of the Soviet Union in securing the most favorable surrender terms possible. Even
as Stalin and his entourage prepared to depart for Potsdam, a special mission by Prince
Konoye had been authorized to seek a meeting with the Soviet leader in Moscow to ask
for assistance in the mediation of the war’s termination. While at Potsdam the Soviet
delegation continued to receive appeals from Prince Konoye for an audience with Stalin.
In consultation with President Truman, the Soviets "decided to give a definite
negative answer to the request that Prince Konoye be received. This served as reassurance
to the United States that the Soviet Union would follow through on its promise to
enter the war, and it was yet another signal to Tokyo that peace terms could not be
negotiated.
Truman’s own news for Stalin on July 24—that "we had a new weapon of unusual
destructive force"—was met with understated congratulations from Stalin. As Truman
reported, "He was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against
the Japanese.’" Observers at the time (particularly Secretary of State Byrnes,
who witnessed the exchange) interpreted Stalin’s nearly casual response as ignorance
about what Truman could have been referring to. However, since then it has been convincingly
argued that Stalin clearly knew that Truman was talking about an atomic bomb because
Soviet espionage and scientific efforts had been focusing on this technology for some
time. In fact, "according to Marshall Georgy Zhukov, Stalin instructed Molotov
to "tell Kurchatov [of the Soviet atomic project] to hurry up the work."
Despite these new developments, which could have easily broken the fragile United
States—Soviet Union relationship, the wartime alliance remained intact through the
last days of the war. Truman shared this vital information, and Stalin kept his promise
of not seeking a separate arrangement with Japan. On that same day the President had
authorized his scientists and military officials to proceed with the final development
and necessary transport of the bomb. In his diary on July 25 he wrote, "This
weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have
told the Sec of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers
and sailors are the target and not women and children . . . and we will issue a warning
statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m sure they will not do that,
but we will have given them a chance."
Consequently, on July 26 the Allies issued the Potsdam
Declaration, which contained their combined expectations for the unconditional
surrender of Japan. Beginning with a statement about the readiness of the United States,
Britain, and China to launch "the final blows upon Japan" and a reference
to how futile German resistance had been, the declaration outlined the terms for surrender.
Included in those terms were the following: (1) the complete elimination of existing
authority and the influence of those who "have deceived and misled the people
of Japan into embarking on world conquest;" and (2) occupation of Japanese territory
until "Japan’s war-making power is destroyed" and "freedom of speech,
of religion, and of thought as well as respect for fundamental human rights [is] established."
In addition, the declaration reassured the Japanese people that the Allies had no
intention of enslaving them or of destroying their nation. It appealed to the government
of Japan to "proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed
forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurance of their good faith in such action.
The alternative for Japan is complete and utter destruction."
At a press conference on July 28 the prime minister of Japan, Admiral Suzuki, issued
a statement regarding the Potsdam Declaration, but translations of his reaction vary.
One historian recorded that Suzuki’s statement was, "The Potsdam Proclamation,
in my opinion, is just a rehash of the Cairo
Declaration, and the government therefore does not consider it of great importance.
We must mokusatsu it." The historian goes on to explain that the word
mokusatsu literally means "kill with silence," but that Suzuki later
claimed that what he meant was "no comment" for which there was no real
Japanese equivalent. This more benign interpretation of Japans reaction would have
left some room for further negotiation had the United States chosen to pursue it.
However, U.S. officials at the time applied the more negative meaning, which was that
Suzuki’s intention was to "ignore" the declaration. Thus, the historical
account reflecting this latter translation reads quite differently, claiming that
Suzuki said, "The Government does not find any important value in it and there
is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful
conclusion of this war." This reply was not unexpected, and both Secretary of
War Stimson and President Truman remained resolved to use whatever force at their
disposal to force Japan to finally surrender.
Meanwhile, one million Soviet troops were amassing on the Manchurian border in preparation
for Stalin’s order to enter the war against Japan, and U.S. air forces had just received
the U-235 portion of the weapon now being prepared for delivery against the first
Japanese target. Nicknamed "Little
Boy," this uranium bomb would be dropped from a special B-29 flight as
soon as final authorization was received from the President and weather conditions
permitted. On July 31 Truman authorized the actual use of the bomb: "Release
when ready but not sooner than August 2." On August 6 (Japan time) the first
atomic bomb ever used in wartime against an actual target was dropped on the city
of Hiroshima.
Even as the first reports of the attack were being received by Japan’s Army General
Staff that "the whole city of Hiroshima was destroyed instantly by a single bomb,"
the Japanese government was hearing over the radio President Truman’s official statement:
"We are now prepared to obliterate rapidly and completely every productive enterprise
the Japanese have above the ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their
factories and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy
Japans power to make war. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain
of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. . . ."
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